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The market of insurance is a typical asymmetric informative market. The fact 
that most economists take the market of insurance as an example to study asymmetric 
information has already proved the severity that asymmetric information influences 
the market of insurance. Frauds of insurance resulting from the informative 
asymmetry of the market of insurance has become one of the main business risks that 
insurers have faced。No matter in links of accepting insurance or compensation and so 
on, the insurers have all taken measures to avoid behaviors unfavorable to them that 
the asymmetric information may initiate，such as the appearance of insurance 
contracts with franchise, maximal compensation and the adoption of the tactics 
unclearly at random for the insured’s damage statement in the claims settlement 
procedure. They are all effective means used by insurers to solve the problems of the 
asymmetric information in the market of insurance. However，any tactics can be only 
tried hard to inhibit and lighten the impact of asymmetric information on the market 
of insurance, because the being of the asymmetric information is eternal. Further more, 
because of the diversification of the risk and the fast change of the environment of 
international economy, the way of asymmetric information impacting on the market of 
insurance is more and more complicated. So, in order to reach the goal of growing at a 
sustained, fast and sound manner in the insurance, we should study the impact of 
asymmetric information on the market of insurance, asymmetric information of the 
insurance activity in the market of insurance, Tactics of games and the behavioral law 
of each side in the market under the state of the long-term or short-term informative 
asymmetry and characters of the operation of the market, etc. The selected title of this 
thesis is exactly based on reasons described above. On the basis of past research, this 
text plans to carry on research to these respects proceed from the insurer's angle, such 
as the balanced competition that may appear in the asymmetrical market of insurance, 
both sides' tactics chosen in the course of compensating and the question of optimum 
allocation of risks 
The innovation shows as follow: 
First, on means and ways, this text has drawn lessons from some models of 
insurance economics and used the game theory to analyze. Under the inspiration of 














the market of car insurance; 
Second, combining the market situation of car insurance of our country, the text 
analyzes the fact of asymmetrical information existing in the market of car insurance 
in China and its characteristic，and puts forward the influence of asymmetrical 
information on the market of car insurance; 
Third, proposing the scheme solving the problem of asymmetric information of 
car insurance through models, and the recommendations to some policy of the market. 
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第一章   引  论 
 1
第一章   引  论 
1.1 问题提出与研究背景 
    保险业发展至今，一些科学的理论与方法也应运而生，尤其从 1693 年英国

































































































保险业的信息不对称问题 早是由 Arrow 在 1953 年提出的，他认为信息不
对称问题是妨碍保险机制正常运行的主要障碍，这种信息不对称问题分为两个方
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